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SARS AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
PREPAREDNESS+ 
Jason w. Sapsin' 
Lawrence O. Gostin" 
Jon S. Vernick'" 
Scott Burris···· 
Stephen P. Tere(*'" 
I.INTRODUcnON 
The disease known now as severe acute respiratory syndrome ("SARS") 
first emerged in November 2002 in China's Guangdong Province and has since 
been described as the first severe, readily transmissible new disease of the 
twenty-first century.! Its relatively rapid dissemination across the globe left 
+ All co-authors contributed to the legal research, analysis, review, writing, and editing of this 
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Brockport. 
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1. The WHO, Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response: Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS): Status of the Outbreak and Lessons for the Immediate Future (May 20, 2003) 
[hereinafter Status Report), available at http://www.who.intlcsr/media/sars_wha.pdf. 
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biomedical researchers and public health authorities struggling to maintain pace 
with the disease in the face of scientific uncertainties and difficult policy choices. 
This article focuses on the earliest stage of the epidemic. We discuss examples of 
how regions faced with SARS turned to disease control strategies based on 
public health law, such as "personal control measures" like quarantine· and 
isolation; weaknesses in the ability of nations' legal systems to frame balanced, 
coordinated and well-executed public health programs for rapid disease 
containment; and the responses of diverse populations to restrictive personal 
control measures. 
This article does not advance arguments regarding the efficacy or 
circumstances under which governments should exercise personal control 
measures such as quarantine or isolation. A literature on this aspect of SARS 
disease control strategies is just starting to develop more fully.2 Instead, we 
highlight the legal aspects of personal control measures employed against SARS 
in order to emphasize the importance of understanding public health law's role 
in authorizing and constraining disease control strategies, as well as the 
importance of legal preparedness in nations governed under the rule of law. In 
the contemporary international environment, one nation's failure in legal 
preparedness can affect global public health and, simultaneously, damage 
perceptions of that nation's ability to engage in cooperative disease control 
efforts and commitment to the protection of domestic civil rights. For example, 
China's State Secrets Law reportedly prohibited local officials from publicizing 
an outbreak in advance of the Ministry of Health in Beijing;3 and considerable 
delay attended the drafting and passing of China's SARS controllegislation.4 
We use examples from the very different governmental entities of 
Singapore, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Canada, and the 
United States to illustrate important public health law and preparedness 
challenges for infectious disease control. While we recognize that the 
experiences of these nations may not perfectly apply in other nations, we believe 
that they represent a spectrum of political and legal cultures. We restrict our 
factual discussion to the very earliest stages of the SARS outbreak ·when the 
public's and officials' uncertainty were greatest and national public health and 
legal systems most vulnerable. We conclude with recommendations encouraging 
enhanced legal preparations for public health emergencies. 
2. See, e.g., J Ou, et al., Efficiency of Quarantine During an Epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome -. Beijing, China 2003, 52 MMWR WEEKLY 1037,1037-1038 (Oct. 31, 2003) (discussing the 
implications of China's quarantine policy during the SARS epidemic and presenting attach rate 
statistics among quarantined patients), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwrIPDF/wkJmm5243.pdf. 
3. Bates Gill, China and SARS: Lessons, Implications and Future Steps: Presentation to the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, at 2, at http://www.csis.org!chinal030512gill_ 
testimony.pdf (May 12, 2003). 
4. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Threat (SARS): Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on 
Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (testimony of Dr. David L. 
Heymann, Executive Director, Communicable Diseases, WHO), available at 
http://health.senate.gov/testimony/031_tes.html (last visited Sept. 7,2004). 
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF SARS SHAPING LAW-FOCUSED RESPONSES 
SARS' public health characteristics motivated authorities' choices of 
disease control strategies which, in nations governed under the rule of law, 
depend on effective legal systems.5 These included: (1) the novelty of the 
disease, resulting in the absence of rapid diagnostic tests to confirm infection and 
the current lack of a vaccine;6 (2) an unusual pattern of comparatively low viral 
shedding during the initial phase of the illness, posing further obstacles to the 
swift development of adequate diagnostic tools;7 (3) SARS' subclinical or 
atypical presentation in some patients; (4) the lack of effective treatment;8 (5) 
the disease's relative severity (an approximate overall case fatality rate of 
fourteen to fifteen percent);9 and (6) its mode of transmission, including the 
phenomenon of superspreading events. Each of these characteristics provided 
incentives to use nonmedical control strategies such as mandatory examination 
and testing, quarantine, and isolation. In the absence of effective therapy or a 
vaccine, health authorities' ability to control infectious disease necessarily 
depends upon preventing transmission by appropriately restricting the 
movement of exposed or infected people.IO Lack of adequate diagnostics limits 
public health authorities' ability to control transmission by impeding 
identification of mildly symptomatic or asymptomatic carriersii and promotes 
reliance on contact history.12 Some SARS cases with atypical presentations or 
lacking history of direct contact with known SARS patients went undiagnosed 
and became "hidden reservoirs of infection on the wards of health-care facilities 
or in the community.,,13 To address this threat, some public health authorities 
5. See Revision of the International Health Regulation, Resolution of the Executive Board, WHO, 
11th Sess., Agenda Item 5.12, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. EBlll1SRl9 (Jan. 24, 2003) (establishing procedures to 
review and revise the International Health Regulations), available at http://www.who.intlgb/ebwal 
pdCfilesl EB11l1eeb111r13pdf; Status Report, supra note 1 (discussing evolution, unique features, and 
global impact of SARS and presenting recommendations for improving surveillance and response to 
future infectious diseases). 
6. Julie Louise Gerberding, Faster . .. but Fast Enough? Responding to the Epidemic of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2030, 2030-31 (2003). 
7. The WHO, Update 71 - Status of Diagnostic Tests, Training Course in China, at 
http://www.who.intlcsr/donl2003_06_02a1enl (June 2, 2003). 
8. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Threat (SARS): Hearing Before the Senate Comm on 
Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (testimony of Dr. Anthony S. 
Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease), available at 
http://health.senate.gov/testimony/030_tes.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004). 
9. The WHO, Update 49 - SARS Case Fatality Ratio, Incubation Period, at 
http://www.who.intlcsr/ sarsarchiveI2003_05_07a1enl (May 7, 2003). 
10. See Barry R. Bloom, Editorial: Lessons from SARS, 300 SCIENCE 701, 701 (2003) (describing 
implications of SARS epidemic). 
11. Gretchen Vogel, Modelers Struggle to Grasp Epidemic's Potential Scope, 300 SCIENCE 558, 
558-59 (2003). 
12. Christopher M. Booth et aI., Clinical Features and Short-term Outcomes of 144 Patients with 
SARS in the Greater Toronto Area, 289 JAMA 2801, 2802 (2003). 
13. Y.S. Leo et aI., Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Singapore, 2003, 52 MMWR Weekly 
407,411 (May 9, 2003) (editorial note), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwrIPDF/wk/mrn5218.pdf. 
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chose to employ aggressive, legally based surveillance and quarantine 
measures.
14 Researchers and clinicians also recommended exercising precautions 
in all cases of undifferentiated respiratory conditions, including isolation of 
health care' workers and household contacts of cases. IS 
SARS also appeared vulnerable to control measures such as quarantine and 
isolation: officials initially believed it to be transmitted through personal contact, 
possibly by air and also by fomites.I6 In addition, "superspreading" events, by 
increasing the perceived risk resulting from failures to contain all cases, likely 
created greater incentives to implement aggressive control strategies. I7 Five 
probable SARS patients in Singapore were each linked to events resulting in the 
apparent infection of ten or more health care workers, family or social contacts, 
or unrelated hospital visitors, accounting for 103 of the 205 probable SARS 
cases. IS Finally, effective isolation and quarantine become more difficult as cases 
accumulate, so public health authorities may more aggressively apply quarantine 
and isolation for a disease like SARS on the principle that "stringent measures 
implemented early in the course of the epidemic prevent the need for more 
stringent measures as the epidemic spreads."19 
III. NATURE OF SARS CONTROL MEASURES UNDERTAKEN 
The recommendations of the World Health Organization ("WHO") for the 
control of SARS provided a backdrop for national efforts, as illustrated in Table 
1. By March 26th, 2003, however, governments had begun independently 
introducing more stringent personal control measures than those recommended 
by WHO 2°-an indication both of the challenge of effectively unifying 
international action, and of some authorities' willingness and perceived need to 
implement mandatory personal control measures. In the process, many 
governments examined and revised their disease control laws. We briefly 
consider selected disease control strategies and their legal components with 
examples from Singapore, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Canada, and the United' States. 
A. Singapore' 
The first, still undiagnosed SARS patients were admitted to Singaporean 
14. Tan Chorh Chuan, National Response to SARS: Singapore, Presentation Before the WHO 
Global Conference on SARS, at http://www.who.intlcsrlsars/conferenceljune_2003/materials/ 
presentations/enlsarssingapore170603.pdf (June 17, 2003). 
15. Booth et aI., supra note 12, at 2807. 
16. Gerberding, supra note 6, at 2031. 
17. Chorh Chuan, supra note 14. 
18. Leo, supra note 13, at 405-10. 
19. Marc Lipsitch et aI., Transmission Dynamics and Control of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome, 300 SCIENCE 558, 558-59 (2003). 
20. See WHO, Update 10 - Data from China, Countries Introduce Stringent Control Measures 
(2003), at http://www.who.intlcsr/donl2003_03_26/enl (March 25, 2003) (suggesting maximum 
measures, such as quarantine to slow the spread of SARS). 
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hospitals from March 1st through 3rd, 2003;21 on March 6th, the Ministry of 
Health was notified of three cases of atypical pneumonia, following travel to 
Hong Kong.22 Table 1 summarizes major disease control strategies employed in 
Singapore. As control efforts advanced (March 3rd - April 27th), the average 
time from onset of SARS symptoms to isolation of probable cases declined in 
Singapore from 6.8 to 1.3 days.23 Officials from the Singapore Ministry of Health 
maintain that broad and sensitive surveillance, rapid and effective contact 
tracing, and early use of enforced quarantine during the outbreak were crucial in 
containing SARS.24 . 
Singapore's public health response included important legal components. 
Authorities declared SARS a notifiable disease under the Infectious Disease Act 
("IDA")25 on March 17th,26 allowing mandatory examination, treatment, 
medical information exchange, health care provider/institutional cooperation, 
use of facilities, quarantine, and isolation for SARS.27 The IDA was officially 
invoked for SARS on March 24th (quarantining contacts and closing hospitals to 
visitors two weeks before the WHO recommendation).28 By March 25th, 
approximately 740 people were in home quarantine under the IDA (with fines 
for noncompliance ).29 They were legally required, among other things, to 
restrict visitors and maintain visitor registries; to respond immediately to health 
department communications; and to keep children under eighteen years of age at 
home.3D Private sector nurses and physicians were temporarily restricted from 
working in more than one medical facility. Further, in contrast to some other 
countries, Singapore concentrated all SARS patients into one facility and 
ultimately achieved containment more rapidly.31 . 
On April 24th, Singapore amended the IDA to: require persons with 
possibly infectious diseases to report to designated treatment centers; prohibit 
SARS contacts from going to public places; enforce home quarantine with 
electronic tagging and forced detention; and allow the quarantine and 
destruction of SARS-contaminated property.32 Section 21A of the Act imposed 
the affirmative obligation to avoid exposing others (outside immediate family). 
21. Singapore Ministry of Health, Chronology of SARS Events in Singapore (2003), at 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/corp/sars/news/chronology.html(last visited Aug. 30, 2(04). 
22. Id. 
23. Chorh Chuan, supra note 14. 
24. Id. 
25. Infectious Disease Act, 2003, c. 137 (Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg (last visited 
Aug. 11,2004). 
26. Singapore Ministry of Health, supra note 21. 
27. Infectious Disease Act, supra note 25. 
28. Singapore Ministry of Health, supra note 21. 
29. ABC News Online, Singapore Imposes Quarantine to Stop SARS Spreading, at 
http://www.abc.net.auinews/newsiternsl200303/s815997.htm (Mar. 25, 2(03). 
30. Singapore Ministry of Health, Information for Home Quarantine, at 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/corp/sars/inforrnationiquarantined.html(lastvisitedAug.11. 2004). 
31. Leo, supra note 13, at 410. 
32. Id. 
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on any person knowing, or having reason to suspect, that he was a case, carrier 
or contact of SARS.33 To mitigate the effects of its aggressive containment 
strategy, Singapore provided economic assistance to people and businesses 
affected by home quarantine orders through a "Home Quarantine Order 
Allowance Scheme".34 While officials from Singapore's Ministry of Health 
maintained that broad surveillance, rapid and effective contact tracing, and early 
enforced quarantine were crucial in containing SARS,35 their actions were built 
upon a strong foundation of accessible, high-quality health and social services. 
B. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
Hong Kong's SARS index case, a twenty-six year-old ethnic Chinese man, 
was admitted to the Prince of Wales Hospital on March 4th, 2003 (the Hong 
Kong Department of Health received notice on March lOth).36 WHO was 
notified of .the SARS outbreak on March 12th.37 Ultimately, sixty-nine health 
workers and sixteen medical students developed SARS directly attributable to 
workplace exposure to the index case; the disease then spread to family members 
(and other contacts) of the affected workers.38 Selected disease control 
measures employed in Hong Kong are summarized in Table 1. As of May 5th, 
2003, 1,080 contacts (from 425 households) of SARS patients had been confined 
and placed under medical surveillance, with the government providing daily 
material and financial assistance to 738 of these contacts (283 households).39 By 
June 15th, 2003, the total number of people served home quarantine notices in 
Hong Kong was 1,262.40 
Hong Kong's control measures also initiated the use and review of public 
health law .. Like Singapore, Hong Kong added SARS to its disease control 
statutes (March 27th, 2003) and notified physicians that SARS was reportable.41 
On April 15th, in order to establish a legal basis for further disease control 
measures, Hong Kong authorities amended the Prevention of the Spread of 
·33. Infectious Disease Act, supra note 25. 
34. Singapore Ministry of Health, Information for Home Quarantine, supra note 30. 
35. Chorh Chuan, supra note 14. 
36. HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SEVERE 
ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME IN HONG KONG (2003) [source on file with author]; Nelson Lee et 
ai., A Major Outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in Hong Kong, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1986,1988 (2003), available at http://content.nejm.orglcgilreprintl348/20/1986.pdf. 
37. Breaking News.ie,. WHO Gives Toronto SARS All-Clear, at 
http://archives.tcm.ielbreakingnews/2003/07/02lstory104647.asp (July 2, 2003). 
38. Lee, supra note 36, at 1988. 
39. Press Release, Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Tokyo: Health, Welfare and Food 
Bureau, Government's Approach to the Control of SARS Outbreak, at 
http://www.hketotyo.or.jp/englishlsarsreport0305073.htmi (May 7, 2003). 
40. E.K. Yeoh, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Response from Hong Kong, Presentation 
Before the WHO Global Conference on SARS, at http://www.who.intlcsrlsars/conference/june_2003/ 
materialsl presentations/enlsarshongkong170603.pdf (June 17,2003). 
41. Letter from L.Y. Tse, Physician, Director of Hong Kong Department of Health, to 
Physicians, Amendment to the Quarantine and Prevention of Disease Ordinance, Cap 141, Hong 
Kong Health Department, at http://www.info.gov.hkldhluseful/ltodlqpdosars.htm (Mar. 27, 2003). 
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Infectious Diseases Regulations to allow health officers to prevent travelers from 
leaving the region; to permit authorized persons to measure travelers' body 
temperatures; and to examine travelers for SARS.42 At least one subsequent 
analysis of public health approaches in Hong Kong suggests that reductions in 
time from symptom onset to hospitalization, population contact rate, and 
incidence of nosocomial infection were jointly' significant in bringing the 
epidemic under contro1.43 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region plans 
a comprehensive review of the Quarantine and Prevention of Disease Ordinance 
to implement long-term strategies for managing all infectious diseases.44 
C. Toronto, Canada 
Toronto's SARS outbreak was the largest outside of Ashi45 and carried 
economic effects estimated at one billion Canadian dollars in gross domestic 
product for 2003.46 A SARS patient was admitted to a local community hospital 
shortly after March 5th; this hospital became the epicenter of the Toronto 
outbreak. The disease was transmitted withm the hospital to patients and 
healthcare workers prior to the implementation of control measures. Transfer of 
patients between health care institutions resulted in further dissemination of the 
virus.47 . Selected disease control measures employed by Canadian health officials 
are summarized inTable L 
The . legal components of Canada's response included the· closure of 
hospitals, the declaration of a public health emergency, the compulsory 
quarantine of recalcitrant citizens, and the imposition of mandatory self-
quarantine. Canada's Quarantine Act and Regulations were amended to list 
SARS in the schedule of diseases; authorize detention of travelers with 
suspected SARS for up to twenty days; allow national quarantine officers to 
compel air carriers to distribute SARSinformation and questionnaires on flights; 
and require aircraft to report en route illnesses. and deaths at Canadian 
airports.48 Health is a joint responsibility of the Canadian Federal apd Provincial 
governments,49 and federal responses included lending personnel and 
42. Press Release, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Speech from Dr. Yeoh Engkiong 
to Legislative Council in Moving Amendment to the Prevention of Spread of Infectious Diseases 
Regulation 2003, at http://www.info.gov.hkIgialgenerall200305/28/0528282.htm (May 28, 2(03). 
43. Steven Riley et al., Transmission Dynamics of the Etiological Agent of SARS in Hong Kong: 
Impact of Public Health Interventions, 300 SCIENCE 1961,1961,1964 (2003). 
44. Yeoh, supra note 40. 
45. Breaking News.ie, WHO Gives Toronto SARS A ll· Clear (July 2, 2(03), at 
http://archives.tcm.ielbreakingnewsl2003/07/02/story104647.asp. 
46. Paul R. Gully, National Response to SARS: Canada, Presentation Before the WHO Global 
Conference on SARS, at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/conference/june_2003/materials/presentations/ 
en/sarscanada170603.pdf (June 17,2(03). 
47. Booth et aI., supra note 12, at 2802. 
48. Health Canada Online, Fact Sheet: Quarantine Act and Regulations - SARS Amendment, at 
http://www.hc.sc.gc.calengiish/protection/warnings/sars/facCsheet.htm!(last visited June 12,2(03). 
49. See The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Threat (SARS): Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 29, 2(03) (statement of Dr. 
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equipment, coordinating strategy to boost the health workforce, screening 
travelers at borders, making employment insurance benefits available for 
quarantined citizens, and arranging tax relief for affected individuals.5o 
Canada also provides an example of WHO's difficulty in coordinating 
health policies across independent, but inter-dependent, regions. Canada 
officially challenged WHO's April 23rd Toronto travel advisory51 and promised 
at least ten million Canadian dollars to promote Toronto as a safe destination.52 
Even as late as May 2nd, a WHO official noted the failure to receive "good, fast 
information from Canada," further stating that "[c]ountries are not very good 
about reporting new cases, even the United States." 53 
D. The United States 
The United States' federal government has authority over public health 
measures at national borders and in matters affecting interstate transmission of 
disease,54 but assumes direction of states' internal health affairs only under 
extraordinary circumstances.55 U.S. Federal SARS control measures are 
summarized in Table 1. By April 2003, the United States' Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention ("U.S. CDC") had deployed more than 40 public health 
professionals and scientists worldwide and assigned more than 400 staff members 
to SARS;56 as of June 18th, 2003, the United had 334 suspected and 75 probable 
cases of SARS.57 
SARS provoked at least one significant change in the United States' 
James G. Young, Commissioner of Public Security, Gov't of Ontario) (describing Canadian 
government efforts to combat and monitor SARS in Ontario), available at http://health.senate.gov/ 
testimony/034_tes.html. 
50. Press Release, Government of Canada, Government of Canada Action to Contain the Effects 
of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.caldefault.asp?Language=E&Page=pmarchive&Sub=NewsReleases&Doc=sarsaction.20030502 
3.htm. 
51. CBC News Online, Health Canada Protests WHO Travel Advisory, (April 25, 2003), at 
http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/ 04/24/sars~ully030424. 
52. Dennis Bueckert, PM Breaks Silence on SARS, CNEWS (April 25, 2003), at 
http://www.canoe.calCNEWS/Canadal2003/04/25173l62-cp.html. 
53. Lawrence Altman, The SARS Epidemic; The Scientists; SARS Cases Are Reponed; Virus 
Found to Persist in Patients, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at AI, Col. 5. 
54. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Fact Sheet on Legal Authorities for 
Isolation/Quarantine (2004), at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/pdflisolationquarantine.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2004). 
55. See Jason W. Sapsin, Introduction to Emergency Public Health Law for Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 387,392 (2003) (discussing state and federal roles 
in emergency public health law response systems). 
56. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Threat (SARS): Oversight Hearing of the Committee 
on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (statement of Julie L. Gerberding, MD, 
MPH, Director, Centers For Disease Control), at http://health.senate.gov/testimony/033_tes.html (last 
modified April 29, 2003). 
57. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Update: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-
United States, 52 MMWR WEEKLY 570, 570· (2003), available at http://ww.cdc.gov/mmwrIPDF/ 
wklmm5224.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2004). 
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national legal structure for disease control. Early in the worldwide outbreak, 
federal authorities found themselves legally powerless to detain a noncompliant 
traveler from China58 and so federal regulations were amended in order to 
address failures to cooperate with SARS control measures.59 While the 
amendment brought SARS within the scope of "national" legislation (section 
361(b) of the Public Health Service Act)60 it could not, however, redress the 
decentralization of public health authority across the United States. State and 
local authorities continued to be able to withhold or delay SARS reports to the 
federal government.61 Also, at least through the middle of April 2003, U.S. CDC 
relied on state and local health department resources to develop the necessary 
methods for actively monitoring exposed persons.62 But facing a smaller 
outbreak than those of other countries, policymakers in the United States 
generally avoided using compulsory personal control measures for disease 
containment63 and such powers were used infrequently. Only five aircraft 
arriving from SARS-affected regions were sequesiered,64 and quarantine and 
isolation tended to be voluntary or quasi-voluntary,65 although there were some 
cases of compulsory confinement.66 
E. Public Response to Control Measures 
Overall, SARS quarantine and isolation events illustrate both general 
compliance with public health measures and the difficulties posed by even a 
relatively few, noncompliant individuals. Officials in Ontario prosecuted at least 
58. Associated Press, SARS Quarantine Authority Ready for Those Who Refuse, available at 
http://www.usatoday.comlnews/nationl2003-04-05-sars-isolation_x.htm; Julie Gerberding, CDC Update 
on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, (SARS) (Telebriefing Transcript), at 
http://www.cdc.gov/odlocJmedialtranscripts/t030508.htm (May 8, 2(03). 
59. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Statement by Tommy 
Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Regarding Executive Order on Quarantinable 
Diseases (describing Executive Order adding SARS to list of quarantinable diseases, legalizing the 
detention of individuals with SARS symptoms if voluntary quarantine is refused), at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/pressl2003pres/20030404a.html(ApriI4. 2(03). 
60. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Exec. Order No. 13295, Revised List of the Press 
Secretary, Quarantinable Communicable Diseases, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidodlsars/ 
executiveorder040403 (April 4, 2(03). 
61. See generally Gerberding, supra note 58 (describing CDC response to SARS and 
recommending prompt reporting and collaboration with state and local health departments). ' 
62. Julie Gerberding, CDC Update on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (Telebriefing 
Transcript), at http://www.cdc.gov/odloc/medialtranscripts/t030422.htm (April 22, 2(03). 
63. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, WHITE HOUSE SETS UP LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SARS 
QUARANTINE, at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2003&m= 
April&x= 20030404I8I847retropcO.1897852&t=xarchives/xarchitem.html (April 4, 2(03). 
64. Donald G. McNeil et aI., A Respiratory Illness: Tracking Disease; Worries Over Respiratory 
Illness Prompt Quarantine of Jet in California, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2003, at AI. 
65. E.g., Mary H. Cooper, Fighting SARS, CQ Researcher 7 (June 20, 2(03). 
66. See Lawrence K. Altman, The SARS Epidemic:'New York; Public Health Fears Cause New 
York Officials to Detain Foreign Tourist, N.Y. Times, April 28, 2003, at Al (describing New York 
City's detention of a foreign tourist exhibiting SARS-like symptoms). 
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one recalcitrant individual67 and threatened unknown numbers of others with 
forced confinement.68 Ontario's Commissioner of Public Security perceived 
noncompliance as the greatest threat to controlling SARS.69 By April 19th, 
however, Toronto health officials had pursued legal measures against only 
fifteen people.1° Singapore enacted penalties for quarantine violation, utilized 
its Security Services and electronic, in-home cameras, and arrested at least one 
man violating a home quarantine order.71 Violations of quarantine led to calls in 
Hong Kong for stricter enforcement of orders with implementation of fines and 
detentions.12 In comparison, Taiwan apparently suffered serious difficulties in 
obtaining public cooperation, including citizens' refusal to register with local 
health authorities before traveling; large scale failures to cooperate with 
epidemiological contact tracing;73 mass disobedience of quarantine orders;74 and 
hospital concealment of SARS cases.75 The United States did not implement 
widespread quarantine. However, polling studies forecast U.S. voluntary 
quarantine noncompliance rates ranging from eight percent to twenty-five 
percent.76 Given the wide range of population responses internationally, the risk 
and consequences of noncompliance must also be considered when planning 
U.S. disease containment strategies. 
67. See HEALTH CANADA, LEARNING FROM SARS: RENEWAL OF PuBLIC HEALTH IN CANADA, 
A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SARS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 178 (2003) 
(discussing ethical issues involved in Canada's response to the SARS outbreak), at http://www.hc-
sc.gc.calenglishlpdffsarslsars-e.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2004). 
68. DeNeen L. Brown, In Ontario, 5000 Are Put Under Quarantine, WASH. POST, May 30, 2003, 
at AI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlac2lwp-dynlA55888-2003May29. 
69. Erika Niedowski, Toronto Sees Setbacks in SARS Battle: Some Refusing to Comply With 
Quarantine Orders, BALT. SUN, April 14, 2003, at AI, available at http://www.baltimoresun.coml 
newslhealthlbal-te. toronto 14apr14,0,2332998.story. 
70. Clifford Krauss, Disease Has Canada Doubting Its Leaders, N.Y. TiMES, April 19, 2003, at 
A6. 
71. Associated Press & Reuters, WHO Sheds New Light on SARS, CNN WORLD NEWS (May 4, 
2003), at http://www.cnn.coml2003IWORLD/asiapcf/eastl05/04/sars. 
72. Patsy Moy, Legislators Back Calls For Quarantine Crackdown, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST Lm., May 24,2003, at 4. 
73. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Fight in Taiwan Is Impeded By Resistance To Isolation, N.Y. TiMES, 
May 12, 2003, at AI. 
74. See Shu Shin Luh, SARS Epidemic Worsens in Taiwan; Home Quarantines Are Often 
Violated, WASH. POST, May 15, 2003, at Al (documenting evasion of quarantine orders by hundreds of 
individuals in Taiwan despite strict penalties). 
75. See BBC News, Taiwan Hit by Rapid SARS Spread,.(May 22, 2003) (reporting two Taiwan 
hospitals were fined for covering-up SARS cases), available at http://news.bbc.co.uklilhilworidlasia-
pacificl3048943.stm. 
76. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Threat: Oversight Hearing of the Committee 
on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 29, 2003) (statement of Julie L. 
Gerberding, MO, MPH, Director, Centers For Disease Control), at http://health.senate.gov/ 
testimony/033_tes.htrnl. See also Clete DiGiovanni et aI., Community Reaction to Biote"orism: 
Prospective Study of Simulated Outbreak, 9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 708 (2003), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidodIEID/voI9n06/02-0769.htm. 
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IV. SARS, PREPAREDNESS, AND LAW 
Experiences with SARS internationally show that: (1) public health 
authorities will rely upon personal control measures (such as isolation and 
quarantine) in outbreaks with certain distinctive characteristics; (2) failure to 
provide adequate public health legal authority in advance of an emergency 
simply defers required legislative or regulatory changes to times of legal and 
political stress; (3) some affected individuals will refuse voluntary personal 
control measures, underscoring the need for mandatory provisions in some cases; 
and (4) most governments appear to acknowledge the requirement to provide 
appropriate treatment of confined persons and preparations for adequate 
logistical and financial support for public health emergency management. Some 
legal and structural lessons related to these observations are described below.?7 
A. Effective health infrastructure as a foundation of disease control 
Nationally effective health care and public health systems are crucial to 
effective disease control in modern societies. They can only become more 
important if health authorities turn to personal control measures. Adequate 
preparation for widespread outbreaks of dangerous, communicable diseases 
necessarily is built on a foundation of accessible health care and competent, 
properly funded public health agencies regardless of the approach used. In 
societies such as the United States, which have chronically neglected public 
• health infrastructures, this entails the swift expenditure of considerable public 
resources to overcome existing weaknesses in the nation's health system. 
Traditional U.S. market-based patterns of health care financing and delivery 
contribute heavily to this problem. Chronic underfunding of public hospitals and 
the lack of surge capacity to handle health emergencies are extensively 
documented and threaten U.S. public health preparedness.18 A recent study of 
urban U.S. hospitals concluded that while most had conducted basic planning 
and coordination activities for bioterrorism response (also relevant to a large-
scale outbreak of a naturally occurring infectious disease such as SARS), "[m]ost 
hospitals, however, still lack equipment, medical stockpiles, and quarantine and 
isolation facilities for even a small scale response.,,79 Staffing shortages remain a 
major concern in public health departments, laboratories and hospitals across the 
country.80 While the United States federal government currently spends billions 
77. For a discussion of SARS focused on specific ethical issues, see Lawrence Gostin et aI., 
Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed By Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the 
Control of Severe Infectious Disease Threats, 290 JAMA 3229, 3229-3237 (2003). 
78. See The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Threat: Oversight Hearing of the 
Committee on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 29, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (on file with author). 
79. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-924, MOST URBAN HOSPITALS HAVE 
EMERGENCY PLANS BUT LACK CERTAIN CAPACITIES FOR BIOTERRORISM RESPONSE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 16 (Aug 16,2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/atextld03924.txt. 
80. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-373, BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS 
VARIED ACROSS STATE AND LOCAL JURISDICTIONS: REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 17 
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of dollars in the area of "homeland security,"81 state officials, local officials, and 
hospital administrators express concern over the sustainability and distribution 
of essential federal funding for improvements in the public health sector.82 
B. Sufficient and predictable authority: the challenge of federal systems 
The governments of Singapore and the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (virtual city-states) could apply SARS control measures uniformly across 
their populations. In comparison, both in Canada and the United States, public 
health law and authority generally is decentralized and state or provincial 
governments largely control public health response, even in emergencies.83 In 
the United States, for example, U.S. CDC generally defers to state and local 
health authorities regarding the implementation of quarantine.84 Even in a case 
of "bioterrorism" (for which it claims lead responsibility), the United States 
federal government has intended to playa mostly supportive role in dealing with 
the public health results.85 
Duplicating governmental structures found in Singapore or Hong Kong in 
the United States or Canada is neither feasible nor desirable. But the inherent 
weaknesses (from an emergency public health preparedness point of view) of 
modern, western federal systems must be addressed. Local, state or provincial 
governments in federal systems may be unaccustomed to acting under conditions 
of public health emergency requiring coordinated approaches. In the Province 
of Ontario, for example, authorities experienced confusion over which entities 
were in charge of the SARS outbreak response.86 Canada's National Advisory 
Committee on SARS and Public Health, in reviewing the condition of public 
health law relevant to health emergencies across the Canadian provinces and 
territories, recently recommended that harmonization be explored.87 It also 
suggested "consideration should be given to a federal health emergencies act to 
be activated in lockstep with provincial emergency acts in the event of a pan-
(Apr. 7, 20(3). 
81. E.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, FINAL R&S: HOMELAND SECURITY - FUNDING BY INITIATIVE 
AREA (charting U.S. Department of Homeland Security funding initiatives), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ homeland/homeland_security_charts.html (last visited August 17,2(03). 
82. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 80, at 28 (noting concern among state 
and local agencies about use of federal funds). 
83. See generally Lawrence Gostin et aI., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: 
Planning and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622, 
622-688 (2002). 
84. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON LEGAL 
AUTHORITIES FOR ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/quarantineqa 
.htm (January 20,2(04). 
85. Sapsin, supra note 55, at 392; see UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT 
INTERAGENCY DOMESTIC TERRORISM CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS PLAN (outlining Federal 
government's plan for response to terrorist threat or incident in the United States), at 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/conplan/conplan.pdf (J anuary 2001). 
86. HEALTH CANADA, supra note 67, at 9. 
87. Id. 
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Canadian health emergency."88 
All nations must take the opportunity presented by SARS' sudden 
emergence to learn lessons in public health law and governance from the 
experience of neighbors. As recently as April 2003, for example, the United 
States General Accounting Office reported that "[a]lthough progress was made 
on local planning, regional planning involving multiple municipalities, counties 
or jurisdictions in neighboring states or a neighboring county lagged ... some 
states lacked sufficient coordination with their neighboring states and ... had not 
participated in joint response planning."89 Local jurisdictions have expressed 
concern over a lack of technical guidance in achieving "preparedness. "90 
Perhaps more alarmingly, during a recent highly-scripted, multi-jurisdictional, 
civilian bioterrorism exercise, United States local, state, and federal agencies (1) 
were unable to agree on the meaning of federally instituted "threat levels," (2) 
experienced difficulty sharing information between agencies, (3) exhibited 
uncertainty over chain of command issues, and (4) found governmental 
procedures unc1ear.91 No federal scheme of legislation currently exists 
paralleling that described by Health Canada, though the United States faces a 
very similar challenge.92 United States public health law reform is still being 
conducted state-by-state, with varying results, two years after the anthrax attacks 
of October 2001; initiatives such as the Model State Emergency Health Powers 
Act93 and the Turning Point Model State Public Health Act94 are necessarily 
limited in their ability to provoke change or increase uniformity across 
independent jurisdictions. As the global spread of SARS illustrates, nations 
failing to update their public health law infrastructures to facilitate disease 
control put the entire global community at risk. 
C. Adequate legal, logistical, and financial preparations 
Governing authorities in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Canada each 
furnished, to varying degrees, financial and material support to quarantined 
populations. Interestingly, in Beijing, China, it is reported that only some 
employers continued to pay salary to quarantined individuals (though all were 
provided food and medicine).95 Societies attempting to follow democratic 
principles and utilizing disease control measures such as quarantine and isolation 
must recognize the extraordinary responsibility necessarily undertaken by 
governments employing these measures. As acknowledged by the Canadian 
government, "[a]pplying the principle of reciprocity, society has a duty to 
88. [d. at 177. 
89. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 80, at 5. 
90. [d. at 28. 
91. Robert Block, FEMA Points to Flaws, Flubs in Terror Drill, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2003 at B1. 
92. Sapsin, supra note 55, at 392, 396. 
93. Gostin, supra note 83. 
94. Public Health Statute Modernization National Excellence Collaborative, The Model State 
Public Health Act: A Tool For Assessing Public Health Laws, at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/ 
improving/turningpointlPDFs/MSPHAweb.pdf (Sep. 16,2003). 
95. See, e.g., Ou, supra note 2, at 1038 (describing the care of quarantined individuals in Beijing's 
Haidon district). 
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provide support and other alternatives to those whose rights have been infringed 
under quarantine.,,96 Singapore, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
and Canada each recognized this duty. In nations which have only incompletely 
addressed this problem, quarantine and isolation regulations should legally 
require confined persons to be provided with: (1) safe, habitable, and medically 
appropriate housing during confinement, (2) necessary food, clothing, and 
medical care, (3) means of communication with family, friends, and personal 
representatives, (4) necessary social services (e.g., childcare and mental health 
services), (5) appropriate legal review; and (6) protection from adverse social 
and economic consequences, such as lost income or employment or insurance 
discrimination during confinement. Major legislative efforts may be required 
now (not during or after an emergency) in many nations to determine certain 
and appropriate allocations of financial, material, and programmatic 
responsibility for public health disease control strategies between multiple 
governmental authorities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
All governments around the globe will continue facing the threat of 
emerging or reemerging infectious diseases,97 rendering the consideration of 
legal and practical ~ssues behind public health preparedness of continuing 
importance. Experience with SARS indicates that national or regional 
governments find personal control measures necessary and will resort to them 
when faced with dangerous, widespread, contagious diseases.98 International 
experience suggests that responsible governments must undertake efforts to 
enhance public health preparedness in law for the benefit of their own and other 
nations' citizens. While the balances struck between individual rights and the 
common good in any given society necessarily, depend on the unique political 
culture and scope of the emergency, when most modern societies rely on 
compulsory personal control measures for disease containment, they must turn 
to rational, robust public health law systems. Overcoming public health's 
structural weaknesses in many modern societies requires that greater effort be 
devoted to the creation of comprehensive public health infrastructures for 
emergency response, uniform public health legislative schemes, and national 
public health emergency practice plans - providing for the imposition of personal 
control measures only when necessary balanced by appropriate legal safeguards 
and full logistical support for the care of affected individuals. 
96. HEALTH CANADA, supra note 67, at 178. 
97. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Threat: Oversight Hearing of the Committee 
on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong" 1st Sess. (statement of Anthony S. Fauci, MD), at 
http://health.senate.gov/testimony/033_tes.html (April 29, 2(03). 
98. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 84; M.L. Lee et aI., Use of 
Quarantine to Prevent Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome - Taiwan, 2003,52 MMWR 
WEEKLY 680, 680-82 (July 25, 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wklmm5229.pdf. 
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Table 1. Chronology of Selected Reponses to SARS Outbreaks by WHO, Hong Kong, Singapore, Toronto, and the United States, February 2003 to June 
2003. 
WHO Hong Kong Singapore Toronto, Canada United States 
Intensified surveillance for severe 
pneumonia following disclosure of 
the Guangdong outbreak.' 
First global alert - First cluster of SARS cases Ministry of Health recommends Activated Emergency Response 
severe, atypical reported in a local hospital. isolation and infection control Center. (3/14/03)' 
pneumonia with (3110103)' measures be used in hospitals. 
health workers at high (3/6103)' Issued interim guidance to local 
risk. (3/12/03)' and state health departments for 
Established a steering committee Ministry of Health issues a enhanced SARS surveillance; Reports from Canada; and expert working group to travel advisory. (3/14103)7 health alert to hospitals and 
travel advisory; address the outbreak and conduct clinics; travel advisories for Hong definition with public education.(3/13/03)' Ministry of Health Task Force Kong, Guangdong and Hanoi. 
"suspected" and formed; assists in the hospital (3/15/03)" 
"probable" cases. 
admission of a Singaporean (3/14/03)' 
resident traveling from New CDC quarantine 
York to Singapore via officials meet more 
Germany. (3/15103)' than 50 flights 
arriving from Hong 
Kong SAR, China 
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Date WHO Hong Kong 
3/16103- Hundreds of cases in SARS added to the Hong Kong 
3/31103 Hong Kong, several Quarantine and Prevention of 
dozen in Singapore Disease ordinance (3/27/03)" 
and Vietnam; 
isolation 
recommended for Quarantined contacts of SARS 
suspected SA RS patients. (3/27/03)" 
cases. (3/24/03)12 
Required that travelers to Hong 
"Sound public health Kong complete health declaration 
forms. (3129/03f' policy to institute 
maximum control 
. measures" but no Isolated all residents of Amoy 
recomm-endation. 
(3/26/03f' Garden arartments Block E. (3/31/03)1 
Airport departing 
passenger screening 
from affected areas 
recommended, but 
not for asymptomatic 
contacts. (3127103)" 
Singapore 
SARS is made a notifiable 
infectious disease under the 
Infectious Disease Act. 
(3117/03)" 
Ministry of Education is told to 
isolate children and teachers 
with fever and travel history for 
a 10 day period. (3/21103)20 
Home quarantine mandated 
under Infectious Disease Act 
for contacts of SARS patients . 
Hospitals closed to visitors. 
(3/24/03)21 
All schools, junior colleges, 
madrasahs, and childcare 
centers closed until April 6, 
2003. (3/27/03)'" 
Controls imposed on all 
passengers arriving or departing 




Advised postponing travel to 
Asia. (3125/03)" 
Closed Toronto-area hospitals. 
(3/23-28/03)" 
Declared a public health 
emergency in Ontario, resulting in 
an order for self-quarantine for 




















einOnline -- 77 Temp. L. Rev. 171 2004
Date WHO Hong Kong 
4/01103- First advice to Relocated residents of Amoy 
4115/03 postpone travel to Garden apartments Block E to 
Hong Kong and isolation camps pending Guangdong. (4/2/03)" epidemiologic investigation. 
First recommendation (411103)" 
for active, 10 day WHO issues travel advisory for 
surveillance Hong Kong. (4/2/03)'" (voluntary 
quarantine) for Required all household contacts 
probable SARS' of SARS patients to remain in 
cases' contacts mandatory home confinement -
and passive, lO-day with monitoring, treatment, and 
surveillance for 
suspected SARS' compliance verification - up to 10 
cases' contacts. 
days. (4110103)31 
(4111103)'" Close contacts of SARS patients 
refused permission to leave Hong 
Kong during their 10 day 
confinement period. (4/14/03)" 
4116103- Travel advisories for Compliance warning letters sent 
4/30/03 Beijing, Shanxi to 26 people regarding mandatory Province (China) and home confinement of SARS 
Toronto, Canada. contacts. All ultimately complied. (4/23103)42 (4116103)" 
All arriving travelers screened for 
elevated body temperature. 
(4/26103)" 
-
Singapore Toronto, Canada 
Home Quarantine Orders Took legal action to force two 
enforced by Singapore security individuals to comply with 
agency (CISCO). Electronic quarantine orders; resorted to 
picture cameras installed in other legal measures for violations 
homes to monitor compliance of isolation orders. (4/2/03)" 
with Home Quarantine Orders. 
(4110/03)" Quarantined 200 workers at a 
Hewlett-Packard factory 
SARS patients discharged from following breach of quarantine by 
hospital are subject to 14-day a SARS-infected worker. 
Home Quarantine Orders. 
(4115/03)" 
(4/9103)36 
Approximately an additional 500 
people are quarantined following 
contact with suspected SARS 
cases. (4114/03)3 
WHO lifts travel advisory for 
Toronto. (4/29/03)" 
United States 
Quarantine of American Airlines 
flight in San Jose (local action). 
(411/03)'" 
WHO issues travel advisory for 
Hong Kong. (4/2103)" 
Issued interim case definition; 
issued travel advisories for Hong 
Kong and Guangdong Province; 
issued notices to travelers 
inbound from affected areas; 
developed interim infection-
control guidelines for healthcare 
settings. (4/4103)40 
Quarantine of recalcitrant 
foreign tourist in New York 
(local action). (Early)" 
Guidance for surveillance of 
healthcare workers and 
prevention of secondary 
transmission to close contacts. 
(4118/03t 
Issued interim travel guidance 






































WHO Hong Kong Singapore Toronto, Canada United States 
Travel advisories for Fifty-year-old man who violated Toronto removed from list of Issued outbreak control plan 
Tianjin and Inner Home Quarantine Order areas with recent local including travel alerts, advisories 
Mongolia (China) and becomes first person charged transmission by WHO. (5/14/03)'" and notices. (512103t 
Taipei (Taiwan). 
with violating the amended (5/8/03)'" Infectious Disease Act. Provided recommendations for 
(5/4/03)" infection control for passengers 
from affected areas (not 
quarantine). (5114/03)" 
Travel advisory for WHO lifts travel advisory. (May WHO removes Singapore from After resurgence of SARS cases, Reissued Toronto travel alert. 
Hebei Province 23,20(3)" list of areas with recent local approximately an additional 5,000 (5/28/03)" (China). (5117/03)" transmission. (5131103)" persons are quarantined under 
threat of hospital confinement. 
(5129/03)'" 
Man placed in involuntary 
isolation in a San Francisco 
hospital following violation of his 
agreement to remain in 
voluntary isolation. (local 
action). (6/6/03)'" . 
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